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I

In the last few years economists have rediscovered the idea that
lowering an import duty on one commodity may increase the amount of
protection received by producers of a second commodity. 1

As Meade

put it in 1955, "suppose that the Netherlands removes a duty upon
the import of German steel without removing a duty upon the import
of German machine tools.

The reduction in the price of steel in

the Netherlands might so reduce the costs of production in the Dutch
machine-tool industry that there was some expansion of that in
dustry and so some reduction in the Dutch imports of German machine
tools. 112

Hal fo,ry 3 points out that the Austrian economist and for

mer undersecretary of state, Richard SchUller, presented a concise
presentation of the present theory of tariff structures in 1905 in
Schutzzol and Freihandel.

Taussig illustrated the effects of the

U.S. tariff of 1824, which increased the tariffs on both raw wool and
1 I have
benefitted from discussion of this problem with David Humphrey,
John Power, and several members of the Economic Growth Center. I am
indebted to several people for letting me use their work in manuscript
form and/or for supplying me with their work sheets. Melanie B. Weaver
and Susan Eggers ably did the computer work. Errors are my responsi
bility.
2J.E.
Meade, The Theory of Customs Unions (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Company, 1955}, p. 103.
3Hal B. Lary, Imports of
Manufacturing from Less Developed Countries
(New York: National Bureau of Economic __Research., 1968), p. 119.
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woolen goods, by calculating the "net protection," which uses selling
price of woolen goods as the denominator.

Wool, writes Taussig, comprises

about one-half the cost of woolen goods and had a tariff of 30 percent,
with woolen goods having a tariff of 33 1/3 percent.

The net protection

is, therefore, 18 1/3 percent on woolen goods; the effective protection
(using value added as the denominator) would be 36 2/3 percent.

Prior to

the 1824 increase in tariffs, the net protection, according to Taussig,
was 17 1/2 percent (and the effective protection, therefore,35 percent),
with wool having a tariff of 15 percent and woolens a tariff of 25 per.
l
cent.
In the early 1940's Felix Weil discussed "protectionism in reverse" in Argentina and gave several pages of examples where the "tariff
handicaps domestic industry ••• duties on raw materials are often higher
than those on finished or semi-finished goods made from them. u2

1 F.W.

Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States~ 8th edi
tion (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1931), p. 75.
2
Felix J. Weil, Argentine Riddle (New York: the John Day Company,
1944), p. 138. I owe this reference to Carlos Diaz Alejandro, whose
recent study concludes "the admittedly partial evidence presented
suggests that cases·of negative-eff.ec tive prot.ection in the Argentine
tariff have been grossly exaggerated." Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, "The
Argentine Tariff, 1906-1940," Oxford Economic Papers, (Marchl967) . '

P•

87.

;•

-3-

There is some evidence that many businessmen also understand that an indus
try can increase the a.mount of protection it receives by obtaining a reduction
in certain tariff rates.

For example, in Panama the law (of 1957) to promote

industrial development indicates that protection to an industry can be given
either by raising the tariff on its product or by reducing the tariffs on its
inputs.

Tariff increases require the approval of the National Assemply; tariff

reductions require only Cabinet approval.

Between 1957 and 1962, l39·firms in

Panama received exemption from tariffs, and only 81 firms obtained higher tariffs
on their output. l

Barber reports in 1955 that in Canada "the sophisticated

tariff expert no longer seeks to have the tariff on his product increased but
tries instead to obtain duty reductions on parts and components that•will in
crease his industry's effective protection •••. While our government's tariff ex
perts are undoubtedly aware of the distinction I have made between the effective
and apparent level of protection provided by a tariff rate, there is some reason
to doubt whether they fully appreciate its importance. 112
Recent research, besides helping to clarify some of the theoretical prob
lems and supplying the label "effective protection" {or "implicit protection"),
has attempted to measure the extent to which a country's entire collection of

tariffs actually protects the value added of a specific industry.

The measure

ment of tariff levels can be of two practical uses: as a means of comparing the
level of protection among various countries (either on the "average" or for a
specific industry) and as a way of studying the effect of the tariff structure
on resource allocation within a country.

Section II discusses the first use

and Section III the second use.
1 Fisca1 Survey of
Panama (Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 173.
2c1a.rence L.
Barber, "Canadian Ta.riff Policy," The Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science, 21 (November 1955), pp. 52~-529,
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II

There are seve ral probl ems with comp aring effec tive
tarif fs among coun tries .
Firs t, such a comp ariso n is of littl e value unles s
one is prepa red both (i) to
assume that each coun try's prese nt excha nge rate is
in equil ibriu m with its pre
sent tarif f syste m and (ii) to spec ify how the coun
try would adjus t its excha nge
rate (or mone tary and fisca l polic ies) to the chang
es in forei gn trade flows that
would occur if the tarif f level were chang ed. l This
poin t, of cours e, is equa lly
valid for comp aring nomi nal tarif fs.
Secon d, the nume rical estim ates of the leve l of effec
tive tarif fs are very
sens itive to, among other thing s, the treat ment of
non-t raded inpu ts. While
Bala ssa's study treat ed them as trade d input s with
a zero tarif f, Carde n argue s
they shoul d be inclu ded in "valu e added " becau se they
are not in infin itely elas
tic suppl y to dome stic produ cers {as are impo rts).
The elas ticit y of suppl y of
both non-t raded inpu ts and facto rs of produ ction depen
ds on the prop ortio n of
the coun try's economy being studi ed. Skill ed labor
or elec tric power may be in
very inela stic supp ly for the entir e indu stria l secto
r while at the same time
being in very elast ic suppl y for one indu stry. The
resu lts of a study orig i
nally desig ned to examine a coun try's total "aver age 11
indu stria l struc ture would
not, there fore, be appro priat e for exam ining the ques
tion, say, of encou ragin g
the expan sion of a singl e indu stry.
1 corde
n discu sses the theo retic al reaso ns for presu ming that
the exchange
rate would chang e. W•.M. Carde n, "The Struc ture of
a Tari ff Syste m and the Ef
fecti ve Prote ctive Rate ," Journ al of Poli tical Econo
Basev i has deriv ed a formu la for the change in the my, LXXIV {June 1966).
excha nge rate that would leave
the balan ce of trade unalt ered as the avera ge effec
tive
Base vi, "The Rest rictiv e Effec t of the U.S. Tarif fs,"A tarif f chang es. Girog io
meri can Economic Review
(Sept embe r 1968), pp. 840-8 52. While Balas sa is aware
piric al study , he assum es that excha nge rates and dome of the probl em in his em
Bela Bala ssa, "Tar iff Prote ction in Indu stria l Coun stic price s rema in uncha nged.
tries: An Eval uatio n," Journ al
of Poli tical Economy (December 1965) repri nted in Read
nomi cs, eds. Caves and Johns on {Rich ard D, Irwin , Inc.,ings in Inter natio nal Eco
1968 ), p. 580.

The effective tariff of industry

i

I--E.--depen ds on value added by industry
l.
when its inputs and output are valued at world prices1 --WV.--and on actual
l.

value added by industry

i

in the country being studies--DV .•
l.

Then the formula

is

E.l. =

DV.l. - WV.
l.

(1)

wvi

Using this formula, several investigato rs have found rather extreme positive and
negative values for the effective tariffs of some industries.

For example, in

Korea, effective tariffs were found to range from 56,386 percent to -5,375 per
cent.2
A very large positive value for an effective tariff simply means that the
tariff structure allows a large domestic value added in an industry that has
small value added in the rest of the world, e.g., the value added by the "pill
packing" industry may be very small in the world, but a developing country may
allow the industry to import vitamin pills in bulk at world prices, put them in
bottles, and sell them at a domestic price greatly above the world price of
bottled vitamin pills.
An effective tariff of less than -100 percent implies that

WVi

is nega

tive, i.e., th~t the value of the industry's output, valued at world prices, is
less than the value of its purchased inputs, valued at w~rld prices. 3 Basevi

1 sometimes
"world prices" are assumed to be synonymous with "free trade
prices. 11 Cf. Balassa, 2£.• cit., p. 584. This is true only in the absence of both
transport costs and tariffs by all countries except the one being investigate d.
2Effective
Protective Rates of Korean Industries (Korean Development
Association , 1967).
3The other logical possibility
--that WV. is positive and DV. is negal.
l.
tivP.--is p:r.oh!=!.bly never observed.

-6and Leith both consider such a negative value added to be "absurd,111 and Johnson
and Grubel call it a "nonsense result. 112

Power suggests that an effective tariff

of less than -100 percent may reflect (1) higher internation al transport costs
for parts shipped separately than for the finished product, (2) greater monopoly
power by the foreign supplier of parts than for the foreign supplier of the
finished product, (3) failure of the domestic industry to use wastes, scrap, etc.,
to the same extent as the foreign producer, (4) a higher domestic incidence of
theft, breakage, etc., or (5) higher relative costs of non-traded inputs, such
as electricity and domestic transport. 3 Soligo and Stern 4 give (3) and (5) as
explanation s.

Lewis and Guisinger suggest that a country's entire price struc

ture can be so "distorted" that a firm can have a positive value added in domes
tic currency even though its value added is negative when all commodities are
valued at world prices. 5
1Giorgio
Basevi, "The United States Ta.riff Structure: Estimates of Effec
tive Rates of Protection of United States Industries and Industrial Labor, 11
Review of Economics and Statistics (May 1966), p. 150 and J. Clark Leith," Sub
stitution and Supply Elasticitie s in Calculating the Effective Protective Rate,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (November 1968), p. 579.
2Herbert
G. Grubel and Harry G. Johnson, "Nominal Tariffs, Indirect Taxes
and Effective Rates of Protection: the Common Market Countries 1959," Economic
Journal (December 1967), p. 764. The most detailed critique of the finding of
negative value added is by Ellsworth. I understand him to say that negative
value added is logically "absurd" and empirically "extraordin ary." P.T. Ells
worth, "Import Substitutio n in Pakistan--So me Comments," The Pakistan Develop
ment Review (Autumn 1966), pp. 395-407.
3John M. Power, "Import Substitutio
n as an Industrializ ation Strategy,"
The Philippine Economic Journal, Vol. V, No. 2 (Second Semester 1966), p. 204.
4R. Seliga and J. Stern, "Tariff Protection, Import Substitutio
n and In
vestment Efficiency, " Pakistan Development Review (Summer 1965), pp. 249-270.
5stephen R. Lewis, Jr., and Stephen
E. Guisinger, "Measuring Protection
in a Developing Country: the Case of Pakistan," Journal of Political Econom,y
(November/December 1968), p. 1123.
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Assuming that large negative values of effective tariffs are no more biased
than small positive values--and are not due to inaccurate measurement of the
relevant variables--then formula (1) gives misleading results.

Industry A

with an effectiYe ta.riff (E) of, say, -200 percent is actually receiving more
protection than industry B with an effective ta.riff (E) of 200 percent, and
one would not want to conclude that the average effective tariff is zero.
can meet this problem by defining the effective tariff industry

i (Ui)

One
as

Soligo and Stern suggest: 1

u.l.

DV. - WV.
l.

=

l.

(2)

DV.

l.

Therefore, in percent

E.

( 3)

l.

Ui = E + 100
i

Thus,

E

of less than -100 percent implies

E between -100 percent and zero implies
than zero implies
dustries

A and

U greater than 100 percent.

U of less than zero.

U between zero and 100 percent.

E greater

In the above sample, in

B have an average effective tariff (U) of 133 1/3 percent,

with the effective ta.riffs (U) being 200 percent for industry A and

66 2/3

percent for industry B.
Another problem concerns the substitution between imports and factors of
production.

Travis notes that if an industry has a Cobb-Douglas production

function, then its observed nominal tariff always equals its observed effec
tive tariff.
1

2

soligo and Stern, .£P.· cit.
willia.m A. Travis, 11 The Effective Rate of Protection and the Question of
Labor Protection in the United States," Journal of Political Economy (May/
June 1968), p. 446.
2

. -8-

Some other problems include: (i) how should depreciation be handled, (ii)
what weights should be used to aggregate tariffs on products as given in the
tariff schedule to obtain the tariff for an industry, {iii) how does one define
an industry,and (iv) how should one treat excise twces and other non-tariff
fiscal charges.

Leith has shown that the empirical results, at least for Tai

wan, are very sensitive to the handling of problem (ii) and to assumptions
about the extent of substitution among inputs. 1 Grubel and Johnson have shown
that the empirical results, at least for the EEC countries, are very sensitive
to the handling of problem (iv). 2
A final problem in making inter-country comparisons (or either effective

or nominal tariffs) is that there is no unique set of weights for averaging
the various industry tariffs, especially when the number of industries differs
greatly among the various studies.
Despite these problems, it may be of some interest to compare the results
of various studies.

Table I shows the unweighted average tariff rates for

various countries and the EEC.

It should be noted that almost none of the

authors of these 12 studies handled the numerous empirical problems in exactly
the same way.

As quotas may be more important than tariffs in determining

actual protection in Pakistan and as domestic prices may not equal world prices
plus tariffs, the line in Table I labelled "Pakistan prices" measures protec
tion using actual prices rather than tariff rates.
Considering the many cases of industries in developing countries having
an effective tariff (E) of less than -100 percent and feeling these observa
tions should not be ignored, I have converted all effective tariffs to
1

Leith, QE.. ill_.

2Grubel and Johnson,
.912.. cit.

U.

-9Table 1
Countri and Year

Number of Industries
(1)

Mean Tariff in Percent
Effective (ul
Nominal {N')
(2)
(3)

Argentina, 19531
Belgium, 1959 2

29

55.1

37.9

29

14.o

12.3

Brazil, 19663

21

57.7

53.4

Brazil, 19673
EEC, 19592
EEC, 1962 4
France, 19592
Israel, 19615

21

43.9

36.5

29

15.4

11.8

36

15.6

11.l

29

23.2

23.3

30

30.4

32.5

29

15.4

15.4

36

22.9

15.l

Korea, 1963-656

218

40.0

35.6

Malaysia, 19637

45

7.9

9.3

Malaysia, 1965 7

45

10.8

10.2

Netherlands, 19592

29

3.6

6.3

32

94.5

53.3

32

45.2

41.7

89

71.3

4o.6

36

13.4

7~6

37

48.2

29.0

7

64.6

43.8

36

21.4

13.9

Italy, 19592
Japan, 1962 4

Pakistan prices, 1963/648
Pakistan, 1963/64 8
Philippines, 1961-65 9
Sweden, 1962 4
Taiwan, 196510
Turkey, 1960' s 11
U.K., 1962 4

-10T~ble l (continued)
Number of Industries

Country and Year

U.S.A., 1962

4

U.S.A., 1958-6012

Mean Tariff in Percent
Effective (U)
Nominal (N')

(l)

(2)

{3)

36

16.5

11.1

~81

18.1

12.4

. I

\

2

West Germany., 1959

7.2

1
David B. Humphrey, nNeasuring the Effe~tive Rate of Protection: Direct and
Indirect Effects," (Journal of Political,. Economy, forthcoming.)
2
Herbert G. Grubel and Harry G. Johns on, "Nominal Tariffs, Indirect Taxes and
1

the Effective Rate of Protection: the Common Market Countries 1959," Economic
Journal (December ~967), pp. 261-276.
I

3Joel Bergsman and Pedro Malah, "The Structure of Protection in Brazil,"
Brazil's Industri$J.ization and Trade Policies (Oxford University Press, forth
coming).

4Bela Balassa, "Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries,

An

Evaluation, 11

Journal of Political Economy (December 1965), pp. 573-594, reprinted in Readings
in International Economics, eds. Caves and Johnson.
5Data supplied by Howard Pack.
6
!
Effective Protective Rates of Korean Industries (Korean Development Association, 1967). Nominal taritfs are given for 220 industries and effective tariffs
for 218 industries.
7Data supplied by John H. Power.

aStephen

,

,

R. Lewis, Jr., and Stephen E. Guisinger, "Measuring Protection in a
Developing Country: the Case of Pakistan," Journal of Political Econom.y
(Novem,
ber/Decembe+ 1968).
9John H. P~wer, 1'Import Substitution as an Industrialization Strategy," !h!,

Philippine Economic Journal, V. No. 2 (1966) 1 pp. 167-204 a.nd dat$. supplied.
by the author.

Tab le 1 (co ntin ued )
10

I-Sh uan Sun , "Tr ade Pol icie s and Eco
nomic Development in Taiwan, 11 (Ta ipe
i,
mimeo, Oct obe r 1966) and dat a sup plie
d by aut hor .
11Anne
O. Kru ege r, "Some Economic Cos ts of
Exchange Con trol : the Tur kish Cas e,"
Jou rna l of Pol itic al Economy (Oc tobe
r 1966).
12
Gio rgio Bas evi, "The Uni ted Sta tes
Tar iff Str uct ure : Est ima tes of Ef'f
ecti ve
Rat es of Pro tec tion of Uni ted Sta tes
Ind ust ries and Ind ust rial Labor~ 11
Review
of Economics and Sta tist ics (May 196
6) and dat a sup plie d by the aut hor .

-12One finds that the effectiv e tariff (U)--colu mn (2) in Table 1--range s from 1.7
percent in West Germany to 94,5 percent for Pakistan prices.

Nominal tariffs

as a percenta ge of domestic prices (N')--co lumn (3)--ran ged from 7,2 percent

in West Germany to 53,4 percent for Brazil 1966.

The mean erfectiv e tariff (U)

exceeds the mean nominal tariff (N') in all cases except France, Israel, Italy,
Malaysia 1963, Netherla nds, and West Germany, but only for Israel, Malaysi a

1963, Netherla nds, and West Ger~any ,does
centage point.

For the

N'

exceed

U by more than one per

24 observa tions in Table 1, the ra.nk correlat ion be

tween size of average effectiv e tariff (U) and size of average nominal tariff
(N') is ,95,

III

It has been suggeste d1 that knowing the structur e of a country 's effectiv e
1 Balassa

and Schydlowsky recently suggeste d that in making public invest
ment decision s "the desirab ility of individu al industri es should be evaluate d
by the use of the effectiv e protecti ve measure . 11 Bela Balassa and Daniel M.
Schydlow sky, "Effecti ve Tariffs , Domesti c Cost of Foreign Exchang e, and the
Equilibr ium Exchange Rate," Journal of Politica l Economy (May/Jun e 1968), p.
353. Their suggesti on assumes that any extra output by the industry under con
siderati on will use inputs purchase d at world prices regardle ss of whether the
country already produces these inputs at costs above world prices. It might
be more realisti c to estimate the time period during which the high cost do
mestic produce r of inputs will continue to operate , to assume that the new
industry will buy from the domestic firm during this period and at world prices
later on, and then to compare the discoun ted costs and receipts of the contem
plated industry with those of other possible industr ies. Another problem with
their suggeste d
criterio n involves the treatmen t of non-trad ed inputs.
As discusse d in Section II, the ranking of industri es by effectiv e tariffs is
sensitiv e to the elastici ty of supply assumed for non-trad ed inputs, and the
appropr iate elastic ity might only be known after a country 's investm ent plan
was establis hed; this discussi on suggest s, therefo re, an iterativ e procedu re,
whereby projects are ranked under alternat ive assumpt ions of supply elastic i
ties and one chooses the group of projects whose use of non-trad ed inputs is
consiste nt with the estimate d elastici ty of supply. Finally , the simple ex
ample used by Balassa and Schydlow sky appears incompl ete. They assume a coun
try already has an efficien t fabric industry and an ineffici ent steel industry .
Should this country establis h a clothing industry --assum. ed to be ineffici ent-
or a precisio n equipme nt industry --assum ed to be efficien t? They opt for the
precisio n equipme nt, but apparen tly ignore the alternat ive of expandin g the
(efficie nt) fabric industry (perhaps for export).

-13Table 2
Tariff's

Count!'.l and Year
Argentina., 1953

Number of
Industries

u =a+

Spearman Rank
e.
Correlation (T ratio)

(1)

(2)

29

.89

29

.83

(T ratio)

R2

F

(3)

{4)

-15.02

l.15
(9.72)

.78

94.4

l.50
(7.75)

.69

60.1

.86

120.4

.81

79.0

,92

296.1

(-l.44)
Belgium, 1959

b N
b

-6,98
·. (--2,42)

Brazil, 1966

21

.96

21.0
( 5,68)

Brazil, 1967

21

.95

2.78
{ . 56)

EEC, 1959

29

.94

• 9.75

'~6.. 85.

.32
(ll.O)
.72
(8.89)
l.50
(17.2)

(5)

(6)

EEC, 1962

36

.85

._ 4.60
(-1. 81)

1.61
(8,68)

~69

75.3

France, 1959

29

.92

-13.88
(-4.37)

1.22
(12.80)

.86

1~3.9

Israel, 1961

30

.Bo

- 3.38
(- .37)

.70
(5.09)

.48

25.9

Italy, 1959

29

.96

-12.95
(-7.20)

.92

303-3

Japan, 1962

36

.71

3.09
( .97}

.57

44.2

Korea, 1963-65

218

.92

6.48
(2.47}

.58

297.3

Malaysia, 1963

45

.73

3.00
(. 50)

( 1.44)

2.19
( .43)

( 3.07)

-11.75
(-5-95)

2.29
( 8.76)

Malaysia, 1965
Betherlands , 1959

45
29

.86
.87

1.56
(17.4)
1.11
6.65)
.61
(17.2)

.48

.76

.05*

2.1

.18

9.5

.74

76.7

-14:..
Table 2 (continued)
Tariffs
U - a+ bN

Countri and Year

Number of
Industries

Spearman Rank
Correlation

{T ratio)

b
(T ratio)

R2

F

(6)

a

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

32

.49

53.1
(2.01)

.36
(1.92)

.11*

3.7

Pakistan, 1963/64

32

.72

- .88
{-.08)

.64
(4.96)

.45

24.6

Philippines, 1961-65

89

.92

13,93
(1.63)

.84
(9.08)

,49

82.4

Sweden, 1962

36

.81

1.20
( .67)

1.49
(8.08)

.66

65.3

Taiwan, 1965

37

.80

26.8
(6.05)

,53
(5.68)

.48

32.3

7

.06

68.3
(3.01)

-.05
( .17)

,01*

36

.76

3.03
(. 86)

1.13
(5.57)

.48

31.0

36

.84

.89
( .33)

1.24
(6.54)

•56

42.7

281

.37

2.00
(1.98)

1.14
(17.88)

.53 319.6

29

.93

1.60
(15.1)

.89 228.7

Pakistan prices,

1963/64

\
'

✓

Turkey, 1960 1 s
U.K., 1962
U.S.A.,

1962

U.S.A.,

1958-60

West Germany, 1959

*Not Significant at 1 percent level.
Sources:

same as Table 1.

-10.70
(-12.0)

.03
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tariffs tells us about the allocative impact of the tariff system: that in some
way the tariff system is related to the rate of return of various industries.
If one knew the input coefficients for an economy in the absence of tariffs,
then an examination of tariffs and all other government taxes and subsidies
would tell us something about the relative effect of government policies on the
allocation of resources among industries.

In fact, however, we only observe

input coefficients in the presence of tariffs; as Travis notes, using observed
input coefficients from a country with low tariffs is not a legitimate way of
obtaining free trade coefficients if its trading partners have high tariffs. 1
If all industries have Cobb-Douglas production functions, then calculating ef
fective tariffs with observed input coefficients tells us almost nothing about
the impact of the tariff system on the rate of return in various industries,
since an industry's effective tariff equals its nominal tariff regardless of
the size of the tariffs on its inputs even though its rate of return is pre
sumably lowered by having tariffs on its inputs. 2
There is no particular reason, in terms of economic theory, why the ex
ante ranking of industries by their effective tariffs should be correlated with
their ranking by nominal tariffs.

Carden argues that "the order [of effective

tariffs and taxes] is likely to be quite different from a similar scale based
on nominal tariff rates and nominal export subsidies and taxes. 113

On the other

hand, if businessmen (and labor leaders) have understood the concept of ef
fective tariffs and if they have believed that politicians use nominal tariffs
to give protection, then the political process which generated a particular
1Travis,

212.· cit., p. 448.
21 owe
this point to Richard Nelson.
3corden, .21?.· cit., p. 224.
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system of protection in a country might in the past have produced a high correla
tion between observed effective tariffs and nominal tariffs.

Or if most indus

tries have a Cobb-Douglas production function, there would be a high correlation
between observed effective tariffs and nominal tariffs.
Column 2 of Table 2 gives, for each country, the rank correlation between
nominal tariffs as a ·percent of world prices (N) and effective tariffs (U).
The rank correlation is above .70 for all countries except Basevi's study of
the U.S.A., Krueger's study of Turkey1 and Lewis and Guisinger's study of Pakistan prices.
the study. 2

The high rank correlation for Brazil was noted by the authors of
None of the other authors apparently made this comparison.

The prevalence of high rank correlation may lead one to wonder whether
decision-ma kers follow some simple rule in setting tariffs for an industry,
such as
Effective tariff - a+ b (nominal tariff)
Table 2 gives the results of such a regression for each country.

(4)

The percentage

of variations "explained" by the regression ranges from 92 percent(in EEC,
1959 and in Italy) to 1 percent for Turkey; R2 is significant ly different from
zero at the· 1 percent level in all cases except Malaysia 1963, Pakistan prices,
and Turkey.

Judging from the

T ratios, the regression coefficient for nominal

tariffs is generally very significant and the constant term is sometimes not
significant ly different from zero.
1Two remarks
may be made about the Turkey study. It covers only 7 indus
tries, and Krueger used interviews and feasibility studies--ra ther than an input
output table--to estimate effective tariffs.
2

Joel Bergsman and Pedro Malah, "The Structure of Protection in Brazil,"
(mimeo, February 1968), p. 20.
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Brazil and Malaysia are the only countries with observation s at two points
in time

The relationshi p between the ranking of Brazilian industries by nomi

nal tariffs and by effective tariffs did not change much between 1966 (.96) and
1967 (.95) despite the imposition of a new tariff schedule in early 1967, which
reduced the maximum tariff rate from 150 percent ad valorem to 120 percent and
lowered the tariffs on many raw materials and intermediat e products.
In Malaysia there is a high rank correlation in both 1963 (,73) and 1965
( .86); the regression "fits" somewhat better in 1965 than in 1963, but even in
1965 is not as significant as in most of the other countries.
One can think of at least three hypotheses that are consistent with these
empirical results:
(i) some participant s in the political process already understood the con
cept of effective tariffs, as discussed in Section I, and achieved desired ef
fective tariffs by bargaining over their own nominal tariffs
(ii) the aggregation procedure for estimating effective and nominal tariffs
for less than 300 industries from a tariff schedule for several thousand com
modities introduces some sort of bias; for example, if one defines only a few
industries, one might expect that for each industry the average tariff on in
puts would approximate the country's average tariff, and hence the variation in
effective tariffs within a country having a few industries would be better ex
plained by the variation in the nominal tariff than a study using many indus
tries.1 In fact, the size of the R2 for a country in Table II has a rank
correlation of -.46 with the number of industries defined for the country.
1 This argument
assumes--no doubt unrealistic ally--that value added is a
constant proportion of price for all industries in a country. Vahid Nowshirvani
suggested this argument.

(iii ) ther e is some sort of economic and
/or tech nica l rela tion ship in each
economy whic h prod uces thes e resu lts; for
exam ple, all indu stri es mig ht have a
Cobb-Douglas prod ucti on func tion , and then
one would have a perf ect rank cor rela tion , sinc e

u

=

N

100 + N

(5}

Furt her rese arch is nece ssar y to dete rmin
e whe ther thes e emp irica l resu lts hold
for othe r cou ntri es and, if so, to exp lain
the ir pres ence .

IV
It may be app ropr iate to atte mpt to deri
ve some simp le con clus ions on the
valu e of effe ctiv e tari ffs in the ligh t
of the theo reti cal and emp irica l work of
the last few yea rs. The disc ussi on of
effe ctiv e tari ffs has und oub tedl y en
larg ed the number of peop le who und erst
and that sele ctiv e tari ff redu ctio ns may
incr ease the leve l of pote ntia l pro tect
ion affo rded some ind ustr ies. Whether
a
redu ctio n in the cost of imp orte d inpu ts
lead s to a redu ctio n in an indu stry 's
sell ing pric e or to an incr ease in its
"ren ts" ("va lue adde d") depe nds on its
mark et stru ctur e and the chan ge in the
tari ffs (and othe r pro tect ive dev ices )
on its outp ut. 1 At the pres ent time data
requ irem ents seem to prec lude , how ever ,
1
The Kennedy Round resu lted in a weig hted
aver age tari ff redu ctio n of U.S.
man ufac ture d item s of abou t 35 perc ent;
the Cou ncil of Economic Adv isor s as
sert ed "A ••• majo r gain from the Kennedy
Roun
American tari ffs on mat eria ls and compone d wil l come from the redu ctio n of
nts used by .American man ufac ture rs.
Both the imp orte d item s and the com petin
g dom estic mat eria ls wil l be chea per,
and prod ucti on cos ts wil l ther eby be redu
tive pos itio n of .American man ufac ture rs ced. As a cons eque nce, the com peti 
usin g thes e inpu ts wil l be improved in
both expo rt and dom estic mar kets . 11 Econ
omic Rep ort of the Pres iden t (Washing
ton: U.S. Government Prin ting Off ice, 196
alre ady have a zero nom inal tari ff, any 8), p. 189 . As many com mod ities
chan ge in exis ting {po sitiv e} nom inal
tari ffs is, of cou rse, a weig hted aver age
chan ge of nom inal tari ffs on all com
mod ities .

any systematic investigation of whether a particular set of tariff negotiations
has increased or decreased the 1-ev-el of protection for particular industries.
One is forced to rely either on illustrations which tend to deal with only a
few inputs1 or on a relatively high level of aggregation.
The theoretical discussion and empirical work do·

not seem to disturb the

economist's traditional dictum that, if a nation is to have tariffs, there is a
strong presumption for a uniform nominal tariff.

This confirmation follows from

the fact that a uniform nominal ta.riff yields a uniform effective tariff.

If

one wants to justify deviations from this uniform tariff for certain industries,
one must compare the theoretical superiority of the effective tariff with its
far greater sensitivity to assumptions about the nature of the economy and the
industry and far greater data requirements.

While governments have learned to

vary nominal tariffs among, say, 5,000 products, it is not clear that one could
collect data in order to set eff.ective tariffs with confidence at such a fine
level for industries.
If one wants rather broad notions about either the relative average height
of a country's tariffs or the ex post resource allocation effects of the tariff'
system, my results suggest one learns a lot--but not everything--by looking at
the ranking
done).

by nominal tariffs (as the studies have actually been

A "true" ranking by effective tariffs may require more information than

we now possess about elasticities of supply of inputs and elasticities of sub
stitution and the definition of industries.
111 To cite only one example, tariffs on a wide range of steel
alloying

materials will be progressively reduced. This should reduce the costs of pro
ducing alloy steels, and of machine tools, machinery and equipment manuf'actured
from such steels, thus strengthening the competitive position of our machinery
industries in export markets." Ibid, p. 189.
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Finally, one should note Travis' view that while effective tariff calcula
tions per

~

are not of much value, "the calculation s require a great deal of

information on tariffs, on other forms of protection, and on interindust ry flows,
and that information is very valuable. 111

1

Travis, 2E.· cit., p. 460.

